Imagine millions of votes being discarded, their voices silenced, all because of a single rule. This is the harsh reality of Indonesia's electoral system, where a parliamentary threshold acts as a gatekeeper, shutting out smaller parties from representation. But here's where it gets controversial: is this threshold a necessary evil for stability, or a democratic flaw that stifles true representation? Let's delve into the heated debate surrounding the 'Hammering on the Door at Senayan' phenomenon.
Every general election in Indonesia sees a staggering number of votes rendered meaningless due to this threshold. A candidate, despite securing a substantial number of votes, can be denied a seat in the House of Representatives (DPR) if their party fails to reach the 4% national vote share. This has sparked a movement led by smaller parties, spearheaded by Oesman Sapta Odang of the Hanura Party, advocating for a reduction of this threshold to 2%. They argue this would create a more inclusive and representative political landscape, reflecting Indonesia's diverse political spectrum. The 2024 election alone saw approximately 17 million votes go unrepresented due to this rule.
But is lowering the threshold a simple solution?
In theory, Indonesia's presidential system, where the president is directly elected, doesn't necessitate a high threshold. However, history paints a different picture. The 1999 election, without a threshold, resulted in 45 parties entering the DPR, leading to a fragmented and potentially weak government. To counter this, a 2% threshold was introduced in 2004, gradually increasing to the current 4%. This shift concentrated power within a few major parties, arguably limiting public representation and creating a system where large parties hold both the reins of power and the rulebook.
The consequences are evident: during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's tenure, the DPR, despite strengthened oversight powers, often obstructed beneficial policies. In contrast, President Joko Widodo, fearing a repeat, formed a large coalition, effectively blunting the DPR's oversight role. This led to the approval of costly projects like the new capital city and high-speed rail without substantial debate.
The issue goes beyond the threshold. Indonesia's unique institutional design, a presidential system with a multitude of parties, creates inherent instability. The president, while electorally strong, becomes politically vulnerable due to the fragmented party landscape. This breeds political middlemen, like DPR Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, who act as power brokers, ensuring the system runs smoothly but potentially weakening government accountability and opposition.
So, is lowering the threshold enough? Perhaps not. Some propose a **premier-presidential```json
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